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Abstract
Corporatist regulation has a hybrid structure in that it covers state regulation, regulated self-regulation as well as private-
public co-regulation. Notably diverging from the standard mode of state regulation, such arrangements required a higher
degree of legitimation. Corporatist concepts flourished in the Weimar Republic. This paper deals with three legal schol-
ars’ considerations regarding how to legitimize corporatist models, namely Edgar Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Heinrich Herrfahrdt,
and Friedrich Glum. Their institutional touchstone was the Imperial Economic Council, as provided for by article 165 of the
Weimar Constitution. This article envisioned a multi-level system of economic councils ranging from regional economic
councils up to the Imperial Economic Council and involving representatives of all occupational groups in the performance
of state tasks. However, only a Provisional Imperial Economic Council, with a restricted consultative remit, was ever actually
established. Based on this model, Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Heinrich Herrfahrdt, and Friedrich Glum conceptualized organiza-
tional structures aiming at the comprehensive inclusion of non-state actors. Theywere legitimized primarily with reference
to their output; that is, these organizational forms were supposed to enable amore appropriate and efficient realization of
public interests. The input-based argument was basically a question of participation, which implies considerable proximity
to typical topoi of democratic legitimation. This similarity is perhaps counter-intuitive, given that corporatist concepts are
traditionally associated with anti-democratic ideologies due to their anti-parliamentarian slant. The numerous points of
convergence between corporatist and democratic thought simultaneously reflect the heterogeneity of democratic reason-
ing in theWeimar period and the openness for ideas that were sceptical of—or even hostile to—parliamentary democracy
and the party-based state.
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1. Introduction
Who is supposed to make the law? In Germany during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
answer was clear: the state. This was the prevailing opin-
ion among the scholars of public law (Anschütz, 1914,
pp. 152f.)1. Until 1918, legal positivism dominated in the
field of public law; an etatist model established in the
mid-nineteenth century by Carl Friedrich von Gerber and
Paul Laband. According to this model, the state was con-
structed as a single, unitary entity unable to tolerate any
other sovereign beside itself and thus rejecting any alter-
native legislative authority. This rather superficial finding
neither takes into consideration the diverse practice of
rule-making nor deviating opinions. Nevertheless, non-
state regulation (especially norm-setting) took place out-
side the established structures and were always in need
of legitimation.
1 One exception was customary law, which, however, had already lost significance by the beginning of the twentieth century.
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The aim of this article is to analyse certain concepts
connected with societal self-regulation and private-state
co-regulation that emerged during the Weimar Repub-
lic: corporatist ideas of regulation developed by public
law scholars. Which regulatory structures were devel-
oped, and how were they legitimized? In order to illus-
trate the context within which the authors operated at
that time, I will begin with a short overview of the non-
state and semi-statal forms of regulation that were al-
ready existent at the end of the nineteenth and the early
twentieth centuries. Next I will briefly outline the ju-
risprudential and political models that emerged toward
the end of the nineteenth century, and which partially
served as a breeding ground for the concepts dealt with
here (1.1.). The following section introduces the Impe-
rial Economic Council (incorporated in the Art. 165 of
the Weimar Constitution), which served as the organiza-
tional starting point for the corporatist concepts (1.2.).
The main part of this text is broken into two sections:
the first section is dedicated to the presentation of these
corporatist concepts (2.). Here, we will pursue questions
such as: How should the corresponding structures of reg-
ulation be composed? What forms of regulatory compe-
tences should the actors possess, and what should their
relation to state actors be? The second section deals
with the legitimation of these norm-setting structures
(3.): Which legitimatory considerations were deemed im-
portant (3.1.)? Which criteria for legitimation were put
in place (3.2.)? Which sources of legitimation and topoi
were applied (3.3.)? Particular attention will be paid to
the role of different concepts of democracy as well as the
possible connections to national socialist ideology. As a
result, the legitimating structures of a regulatory concept
will be exposed; a concept which from the contemporary
perspective seems alien and hostile towards democracy.
Nevertheless, I want to stress that this understanding
was an attempt to react to political crisis and new soci-
etal differentiations.
1.1. Traditions of Legal Pluralism and Non-State
Norm-Setting Structures in Nineteenth Century Germany
Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century,
a variety of new forms of non-state regulation or reg-
ulation only partially embedded in the state structures
emerged. Generally speaking, we can distinguish be-
tween three different kinds: judicial, administrative, and
norm-setting. Judicial forms included for instance perma-
nent commercial arbitration courts, which excluded the
competence of state courts, arbitrating bodies respon-
sible for labour and social law staffed with representa-
tives of the involved groups, as well as mediation panels
for dealing with conflicting group interests, for instance,
between health-insurance providers and doctors or be-
tween banks, credit cooperatives, and savings banks. Ad-
ministrative forms included for example the supervision
of technical facilities by private associations, themanage-
ment of water resources by water cooperatives, the or-
ganization by health insurance providers or the organiza-
tion of occupational safety by employers’ liability insur-
ance associations (Collin, 2016).
However, what attracted the most attention were
the norm-setting forms, for they most sharply called into
question the state monopoly on regulation. Here, too,
we are dealing with a manifold of forms: transport reg-
ulation by railway companies; codification of trade prac-
tices by chambers of commerce; competition laws be-
tween representatives of business conglomerates; car-
tel statutes; technical standards by engineering asso-
ciations; and requirements for vocational training by
chambers of crafts (Collin, 2015). Non-state normativ-
ity was most vivid and obvious in labour law, as Rud-
ischhauser (2016) shows in a recent study. There was
no uniform concept of legitimation for all these norm-
setting forms. Nonetheless, it was the concept of auton-
omy that had the greatest impact. The concept of auton-
omy, which states that non-state associations are also al-
lowed to set norms, can be found in publications of le-
gal positivism, too. There, however, the right to auton-
omywas bestowed by the state. Hence, it was no original
right, but rather derived from state sovereignty (Kremer,
2012, p. 28).
The Genossenschaftstheorie (theory of cooperative
associations)2 also considered autonomy to be a source
of law; however, its conception of autonomy was much
more state-independent. This theory, which is associ-
ated above all with names like Georg Beseler (1843,
pp. 182–183), Otto Bähr (1864, pp. 31–32) and—most
prominently—Otto von Gierke (1873, 1902), tried to de-
rive the existence of independent fields of law from the
existence of non-state cooperative associations, which
would also imply the existence of a self-contained leg-
islative power. This concept of autonomy established it-
self in the legal literature, but its persuasiveness and
its scope of validity had noticeably eroded starting
in the 1870s, as the sway of the cooperative move-
ment waned and the state convincingly claimed its
monopoly on lawmaking (Collin, 2014, pp. 165–228; Kre-
mer, 2012, pp. 3–32).
In the nineteenth century, too, corporative state
concepts were becoming more influential (Mayer-Tasch,
1971; Meyer, 1997; Nocken, 1981; Ritter, 1998). Essen-
tially, they aimed at the abolition or relativization of a
parliament elected by universal suffrage. They wanted
to establish a body of representation composed of rep-
resentatives from various occupational groups. To an ex-
tent, they were still oriented towards pre-modern and
pre-constitutional conceptions and models. And in this
respect, one could certainly characterize them as con-
servative. Yet, such a characterization cannot sufficiently
2 The difference between cooperative and corporatist in terms of political theory is that the former is mainly concerned with various associations and
communities within the state and emphasizes the preservation of their legal capacity. The second concept deals mainly with shaping macro-societal
structures. However, there is considerable overlap between the two concepts.
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explain the appeal of these concepts exercised. Espe-
cially during the second half of the nineteenth century,
corporatist ideas were also an attempt to take into ac-
count new social differentiations as well as to integrate
the working class. To this end, parliamentary-like coun-
cils were to be established which were supposed to rep-
resent the realities of economic life and which above
all had equipped with advisory functions. In practice,
however, these ideas never gained traction. Bismarck
failed in his attempt to install an economic parliament
(Deutscher Volkswirtschaftsrat), at the Imperial level, as
a competing model to the Reichstag. Furthermore, the
Prussian Volkswirtschaftsrat that Bismarck had initiated
was dissolved a few years later, since the Prussian parlia-
ment had refused to fund it.
1.2. The Imperial Economic Council as the Conceptual
Starting Point
In certain sense, these concepts crossedpaths again after
1918. Once the monarchy had been overthrown, a new
constitution was intended to sort out the changed cir-
cumstances. The primary author of the draft constitution
was the left-liberal jurist, Hugo Preuß, a student of Otto
von Gierke. He only envisioned the draft constitution
as a purely parliamentarian system. There was no place
for councils or boards other than the parliament (Rit-
ter, 1994, p. 77; Westphal, 1925, p. 51). Yet this concept
met with bitter resistance on the part of the workers,
who were striving to create a council system based on
the Russian model. Demonstrations, strikes, and armed
assaults were the result of this opposition. The govern-
ment reacted by offering an amended draft of the con-
stitution. The article at the centre of this struggle was
Art. 34a, which provided for the establishment of work-
ers’ councils, especially in the companies, and creation
of economic councils in which employees and employ-
ers alike were represented (Albrecht, 1970, pp. 91–95;
Riedel, 1991, p. 126).
However, even the workers’ party, the SPD, was
partly sceptical towards the idea of establishing councils.
Several leading members were confident that it could
achieve the party’s goals and push forward its ideas in
a parliamentarian system. From a number of different
directions, attempts were made to convince the con-
stituent assembly of the viability of the council system
concept. The Ministry of Economics used economic con-
siderations tomake its point: The councils should be part
of a Gemeinwirtschaft (social economy) (Moellendorff,
1919, p. 8; Gesch, 1926, p. 19). These ideas were mainly
propagated by the Undersecretary of State at the Min-
istry of Economics, Wichard von Moellendorff, one of
the most important architects of the concept of social
economy, who had the Prussian Volkswirtschaftsrat in
mind when it came to the creation of an economic coun-
cil (Glum, 1930b, p. 579). Already before 1918, during
the war, he had advocated the establishment of an eco-
nomic council (Moellendorff, 1916, p. 32). In this case,
the economic council was embedded in technocratic ap-
proaches based on a planned economy.
Hugo Sinzheimers’s line of argumentation turned out
to be more persuasive. Sinzheimer was a jurist and SPD
deputy in the constituent assembly. He is referred to
as one of the “fathers” of labour law, which he con-
sidered to be a primary field of application when it
came to non-state regulation. Already during the war,
he advocated the establishment of economic councils
(Sinzheimer, 1916, pp. 198–202). In contrast to Moellen-
dorff, his approachwas not technocratic, but—heavily in-
fluenced by Gierke—rather emancipatory in its concep-
tion: Alongside the domain of the state, there should be
a social spherewhere the involved parties autonomously
establish their own law or at least are involved to a signif-
icant extent in the norm-setting process. For this to take
place, independent organisational structures were sup-
posed to be established. As a result, a “social parliamen-
tarianism” should be created alongside the “state parlia-
mentarianism”, whichwould primarily be situatedwithin
the Imperial Economic Council (Albrecht, 1970, pp. 100–
103; Völtzer, 1992, pp. 294–297). Sinzheimers’s plea was
very well received in the constituent assembly. Having
recognized corporative state elements in the idea of the
Imperial Economic Council, conservative representatives,
too, appreciated Sinzheimers’s approach (Albrecht, 1970,
p. 143; Pohl, 2002, p. 194ff.; Ritter, 1994, p. 98).
The result of the consultations in the National Assem-
bly was Art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution. Art. 165
III–VI provided for the establishment of a central body in
which all of the important professional groups were sup-
posed to be represented, and that it was to be consulted
regarding all economically and socio-politically relevant
draft bills. In addition, the Imperial Economic Council was
supposed to have the right to draft bills of its own. Fur-
thermore, this norm provided for the establishment of
regional economic councils (Bezirkswirtschaftsräte) with
an analog structure. In the end, only the central board,
the Provisional Imperial Economic Council (Vorläufiger
Reichswirtschaftsrat), was ever erected. The effects of
this council were limited in scope (Lilla, 2012; Rehling,
2011, pp. 180–182).
Thus, an incomplete institution had been created, an
institution that provided a resonance chamber or space
for a variety of partly conflicting approaches: for socialist
as well as conservative views, for democratic as well as
for anti-democratic ideas, for concepts of self-regulation
and corporatist state models. The Imperial Economic
Council was the conceptual starting point for the authors
discussed in the following sections.
2. Corporatist Concepts in Public Law
I will illustrate how the debate itself developed among
scholars of public law by looking at the work of three
authors: Edgar Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Heinrich Herrfahrdt,
and Friedrich Glum. In the literature, quite often just
the first two are classified as distinct representatives of
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the corporatist movement among public-law professors
(Bohn, 2011; Meinck, 1978; Meyer, 1997; Stolleis, 1999,
p. 173). It was only a small group in the state law com-
munity to which only Franz Jerusalem could also be in-
cluded (Jerusalem, 1930, pp. 23–25), though he focused
on sociology.3 Friedrich Glum, in contrast, is normally not
regarded as a member of this group. Still, his conception
of the Imperial Economic Council showsmany similarities
to corporatistmodels, which demonstrates the openness
of such models to non-corporatist elements. In general,
the idea was to base comprehensive models of the state
on a specific variation of corporatism in which decision-
making power and influence is located in forums orga-
nized around particular occupations.
2.1. Edgar Tatarin-Tarnheyden
Of all the public law professors, Edgar Tatarin-Tarnhey-
den was the one who had developed the most distinct
corporatist concept. A Baltic German raised in the Tsarist
Empire, he moved to Germany in 1917, completed his
habilitation thesis in 1922 and became a professor at the
University of Rostock in the same year.4 Already in his
habilitation (second thesis) his preference for the replac-
ing the parliamentary system with a corporatist system
was evident. At the time, however, he saw little chance
for this to come to pass and, therefore, satisfied him-
self with calls for the establishment of a second chamber
beside the Reichstag (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1922, p. 243).
Despite this reticence, he developed an extended corpo-
ratist concept in his 1922 book that reappeared in later
publications. The Imperial Economic Council was his pro-
totype, and he proposed expanding it in three directions.
Firstly, it was to be placed on a foundation of local and
regional economic councils (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1930,
pp. 64–66, 1931, pp. 23–24). Secondly, he intended to
broaden its social basis by including further professions,
such as white-collar professions and other social groups,
like mothers (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1922, pp. 237–239).
Thirdly, he wanted to expand the Imperial Economic
Council’s powers to include the authority to enact laws
(Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1930, p. 62, 1931, p. 24).
2.2. Heinrich Herrfahrdt
Similarly for Heinrich Herrfahrdt, Privatdozent at the Uni-
versity of Greifswald and extraordinary professor since
1932,5 art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution was the con-
ceptual point of departure. He also proposed expand-
ing the system of corporatist bodies by placing it on
a broader and more functionally differentiated founda-
tion (Herrfahrdt, 1921, p. 149). However, in contrast to
Tatarin-Tarnheyden, he sought to spare these bodies the
dilemma faced by the parliamentary system, namely that
questions of substance are secondary to the search for
majorities. Therefore, the corporatist bodies should not
act bymeans of voting but through consultation. In order
to equip this consulting functionwith sufficient authority,
the corporatist institutions were to be represented in the
parliamentary legislative committees by their experts
(Herrfahrdt, 1921, pp. 168–170) in order to participate
in the regulation of parliamentary processes. This pro-
posal also gained prominence in later publications (Her-
rfahrdt, 1932, pp. 31–32), as Herrfahrdt shows a more
anti-parliamentarian attitude (Meyer, 1997, p. 247f.).
However, he expanded it by pleading for stronger cor-
poratist structures at the municipal level as well as for a
share of the decision-making power instead of a merely
consultative role (Herrfahrdt, 1925, p. 546).
2.3. Friedrich Glum
Friedrich Glum fits less comfortably in this group. Firstly,
asmentioned above, he is usually not considered amem-
ber of the group of corporatist legal scholars. Secondly,
his primary focus lied outside of academic research. Nev-
ertheless, he was a legal scholar holding the professo-
rial qualification (Habilitation), and as Director-General
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (the precursor of the Max
Planck Society), he was influential among academics.6
Glum was not excluded from the corporatist group
without reason. Although his starting point for non-
parliamentary regulationwas also the Imperial Economic
Council, he approached it with a different emphasis, es-
pecially in the late 1920s. He explicitly argued against a
corporatist system on the basis of occupational represen-
tation because he equated thiswith the hegemony of the
economy (Glum, 1929, p. 49, 1930a, pp. 74–75). Despite
this, he considered the Imperial Economic Council, which
was organized by occupation, to be an appropriate instru-
ment for the realization of his own proposals. Glum em-
ployed an argumentative trick to overcome the apparent
contradiction: he regarded the Imperial Economic Coun-
cil not as a body representing the interests of particular
occupational groups, but rather as a body representing
the overarching economic interests (Glum, 1925, p. 17,
1929, pp. 46, 49). Therefore, Glum refused to consider
the Imperial Council in terms of a mere advisory board.
Because of its position as a representative of overall in-
terests, so he argued, it would be in a position to set
the agenda and not merely serve in an advisory capacity
(Glum, 1929, pp. 47–48).
3 Stolleis (1999, p. 173) includes Ernst Rudolf Huber and Hans Gerber. Huber was indeed concerned with corporatist concepts (Norpoth, 1998, p. 79f.;
Walkenhaus, 1997, pp. 63–65), though they did not play a central role for him (Jürgens, 2005, p. 126). He was sceptical about their realism and their
opposition to the authoritarian conceptions of the state, which he preferred (Huber, 1932, pp. 953–958). Hans Gerber held a similar conception of the
state, but he did not go further than a few complementary comments (Gerber, 1932, p. 27). This also applies to Heinrich Triepel, who likewise neglected
to develop concepts of his own in this direction (Triepel, 1928, pp. 36-37; see also Gassner, 1999, p. 419).
4 For biographical information, see Buddrus and Fritzlar (2007, pp. 397–399).
5 For further biographical information, see Schwinge (1961).
6 For biographical infomation, see Weisbrod (1995) and Przyrembel (2004).
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3. Legitimation Patterns
While this account of a handful of corporatist theories
is admittedly brief, it nevertheless suffices to raise the
question of how they treat the legitimation of non-state
regulation and private-state regulation, respectively. The
models presented below are especially noteworthy in
twoways for how they legitimate. On the one hand, they
aimed at enlarging the legitimation basis of state activity.
Basing the exercise of public power exclusively on parlia-
mentary principles was seen as inadequate, and the in-
clusion of non-state organizations was intended to com-
pensate for this deficit.
On the other hand, these concepts legitimize non-
state regulation in the form of public–private co-
regulation, that is, the partial transfer of regulatory func-
tions to non-state actors. Despite Tatarin-Tarnheyden’s
references to Gierke, nobody supported regulation with-
out any state involvement.
The following observations are structured around the
framework described in the preliminary remarks of this
special edition. Accordingly, I deal with legitimation re-
quirements, criteria of legitimacy, as well as with sources
of legitimation and legitimation topoi.
3.1. Legitimation Requirements
There are different types of legitimation requirements to
consider: legal legitimation in the sense of justification
through existing higher-ranking norms and legitimation
in the sense of de lege ferenda proposals based upon
state theoretical considerations. In either instance, the
focus was on the Imperial Economic Council. The Impe-
rial Economic Council did not require special legal legiti-
mation, because it was already provided for in the con-
stitution and thus legitimized by a supreme norm. How-
ever, this legal legitimation would not suffice if this struc-
ture were to be expanded beyond the authority and
boundaries defined by the constitution. Taking the Impe-
rial Economic Council as a prototype for further concep-
tualizations of general patterns of non-state or private-
state regulation required legitimation on the basis of
constitutional theory rather than constitutional law, for
this was the corporatist project in the proper sense. The
crucial point for the corporatist authors was not only
staffing state boards with non-state actors, which would
have been etatist-centralist corporatism. Rather, their ba-
sic idea was a kind of bottom-up corporatism as an en-
compassing mode of societal self-regulation. Non-state
groups should be in charge of their own affairs, and this
mode of self-regulation should also be applied to regula-
tory structures organized by the state. This was, as men-
tioned above, the common denominator—but with dif-
ferent emphasis.
Tatarin-Tarnheyden started with “internal self-regula-
tion”7 (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1930, p. 62) for the communi-
ties on the lowest level and extrapolating this kind of leg-
islation as the primary mode up to the highest level. Simi-
lar thinking can be observed in Herrfahrdt’s works: “Every
groupmanages its internal affairs autonomously; matters
of common interest are to be regulated as much as pos-
sible by means of voluntary cooperation”8 (Herrfahrdt,
1932, p. 24). These conceptions of self-government were
ultimately rooted in the thinking of Georg Beseler and
Otto von Gierke. In the slightly weaker form of the con-
sultative participation of societal groups, this concept can
also be found in Glum’s works (Glum, 1925, p. 24).9 For all
of them, the issue came down to entrusting non-state ac-
tors with public authority and this required legitimation.
3.2. Legitimacy Criteria
What are the standards for the participation of non-state
actors in regulatory activities? The corporatist authors’
concepts can be differentiated along the lines of input
and output criteria. The input criteria reflect the topos
of “participation”, which would find broad agreement
among these authors. The argument was that represen-
tative bodies that allow the persons or groups affected to
express their concerns would guarantee greater partici-
pation than the parliaments where interests were medi-
ated by political parties interested in the accumulation
of political power (Glum, 1920, p. 5, 1925, pp. 9, 23,
1929, p. 32; Herrfahrdt, 1921, pp. 149, 168–170; Tatarin-
Tarnheyden, 1922, pp. 241–242, 1931, p. 23).
The second legitimacy criterion, the effective realiza-
tion of public interests, fits more easily on the output
side; however, this single criterion displayed consider-
able internal variation. According to Tatarin-Tarnheyden,
communicating special interests in a corporatist repre-
sentative body posed no threat, because his new, all-
encompassing corporatist system would ensure that all
particular issues would have an equal voice. Thus, this
“ensemble of particular interests” (Tatarin-Tarnheyden,
1922, p. 241) wouldmaximize public interest. Herrfahrdt,
by contrast, did not focus on formulating and balanc-
ing particular interests, but rather on the integration
of expertise from the affected groups into the process
of formulating public interests. Effective realization of
public interests meant for him primarily the “appropri-
ate” communication of the “true interests of the peo-
ple”, protected from distortions by the party system (Her-
rfahrdt, 1921, pp. 144–145, 1925, p. 543). Glum also em-
phasized that corporative representation should be or-
ganized such that the struggles among particular inter-
ests recede into the background. Instead, communica-
tion should be arranged to give prominence to general
interests (Glum, 1929, pp. 52–54).
7 “Normsetzung für den eigenen Kreis”.
8 “Jede Gruppe verwaltet ihre inneren Angelegenheiten selbst, die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten werden möglichst imWege freien Zusammenwirkens
bewältigt…”.
9 “Heranziehung der Nächstbeteiligten”.
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3.3. Sources of Legitimation and Legitimation Topoi
A central legitimation topos in the concepts described
here was “democracy”. This is perhaps surprising at first
glance, as the authors mentioned here are usually con-
sidered anti-democratic.
However, the typology underlying the classification
of “democratic” and “anti-democratic” needs revision,
because the range of political-conceptual opinions in the
Weimar Republic is easily misconstrued. Early research
focused almost exclusively on the anti-parliamentarian
right-wing, whose program, however diverse it may
have been, was summarized under the topos of “anti-
democratic thinking” (Sontheimer, 1964). Decisive for
this classification was the rejection of the parliamentary
or party system by the rightists. Thereby, not only did the
early research lose sight of “democratic thinking”, but,
due to the omission of a comparison of “democratic and
“anti-democratic” thinking, it meant that therewas a lack
of sufficient criteria when it came to the precise recon-
struction of the political range of opinions (Schönberger,
2000, p. 156).
Recent research has recognized this problem and has
contributed to a more nuanced picture. This change of
perspective results, first, from placing “democratic think-
ing” or, to be more precise, the concepts of political the-
ory attributed to the democratic spectrum, at the cen-
tre of current research (Groh, 2010; Gusy, 2000; Klein,
2007). Second, right-wing conceptions of democracy
have received more attention (Lobenstein-Reichmann,
2014; Rehling, 2015).
These shifts in perspective have led, firstly, to reject-
ing a uniform understanding of democracy (Groh, 2014,
p. 238). This was, on the one hand, due to the fact that
the Weimar Constitution equivocates on this question.
It contains parliamentary decision-making mechanisms,
extensive authority for the president (Reichspräsident),
direct democracy by referendum as well as the participa-
tion of corporatist bodies (Kühne, 2000, p. 126). On the
other hand, the term “democracy” was used by almost
all of the political forces involved, giving it a variety of
inflections. What concept of democracy lay behind any
utterance is only partly indicated by adjectives such as
“true”, “real”, “social”, “socialist”, “bourgeois”, “German”
and “Christian” (Eitz, 2015, p. 110).
Secondly, recent research has shown that current
standards are not very helpful in determining what con-
cepts are to be classified as “democratic”. Especially
those of the modern German constitution (Grundgesetz)
are misleading. By today’s standards, not only leftist
ideas of a soviet republic (Räterepublik) found in the
early Weimar Republic, but also the concepts of eco-
nomic democracy (Naphtali, 1928) developed later in the
period would be considered “undemocratic” (Gehlen,
2013, pp. 144–145).
To avoid this pitfall, Gusy proposed using a “histori-
cally appropriate, realistic concept of democracy” (Gusy,
2000, p. 637). I seek to follow this counsel by using Gusy’s
criteria to distinguish “democratic” from “undemocratic”
(Gusy, 2000, p. 637):
(1) Democracy implies sovereignty of the people un-
derstood as all citizens independent of ethnic or
racial criteria;
(2) The people are not imagined as an ideal unity, but
as a plural entity whose origin is the individual;
(3) The will of the people is not ideally presupposed
and merely revealed via elections and referenda,
but rather this will first come into being through
such elections and referenda;
(4) Shaping of the will of the people requires a com-
plex organization in which parties and associations
play an important role in mediating that will;
(5) Managing the affairs of state is not concentrated
in the person of an individual leader, but spread
among a multiplicity of leaders.
These criteria reveal not only to what extent public
law scholars who are usually considered “confirmed
democrats” (for instance, Hugo Preuß, Gerhard Anschütz,
Hermann Heller) wavered in their democratic attitude
(Groh, 2010, pp. 41, 62, 183; Schönberger, 2000, pp. 165–
167), they also clarify to what extent the concepts of
corporately-minded lawyers overlapped with the demo-
cratic spectrum. This point is also emphasized in modern
historical research on corporatism (Rehling, 2015, p. 134).
Before subjecting Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Herrfahrdt,
and Glum’s concepts to the criteria above, a caveat
should be mentioned. The premise, shared by all cor-
poratist authors, was the refusal of a democracy based
only on, first, a simple headcount principle and, sec-
ond, on the mediation of the popular will exclusively
through political parties. This “quantitative” understand-
ing of democracy was contrasted by a “qualitative” un-
derstanding, in which the “true” interests of the people
could manifest themselves. Here, too, however, there
were a variety of different emphases.
In Tartarin-Tarneyden’s concept of an “organic”
democracy, small communities at the lowest level were
to regulate their own distinct domains, as mentioned
above. For higher level legislation, these communities
would delegate representatives to “larger units of com-
munity work” (“größeren Zellen der Gemeinschaftsar-
beit”). Thus, Tatarin-Tarnheyen conceived democratic
structures organized as being built from the bottom up
(Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1930, p. 62, 1931, pp. 23–24).
Glum similarly thought in terms of a “true” democ-
racy, even though the organizational design was not as
distinct as Tatarin-Tarnheyden’s concept. His concept of
democracy was also characterized by patterns of self-
government. However, it must be said that in the late
Weimar period, an elitist understanding of democracy
was ascendant that displayed admiration for Mussolini’s
Italy (Glum, 1930a). Furthermore, he considered the par-
ticipation of non-state actors and the self-organization
of social groups as a mode of integration into the state
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(Glum, 1929, pp. 32–34, 1930a, pp. 16, 129). By using the
term “integration”, he alluded to Rudolf Smend’s much
discussed concept of “integration” (Glum, 1929, p. 34).
Smend had confined the application of his concept to
state mechanisms and political parties without applying
it in semi-official contexts (Smend, 1928),10 soGlum tried
to expand the idea and to thus develop an additional le-
gitimation topos for non-state regulation.
While Herrfahrdt did not present an elaborate con-
cept of democracy as a legitimation topos for corporatist
conceptions, he nevertheless also viewed popular gov-
ernment as a basic premise, though excluding the dis-
torting effects of party domination (Herrfahrdt, 1921,
pp. 144–145). In his view, popular government develops
best in the context of self-government (Herrfahrdt, 1922,
1932, p. 30). This topos is also evident in the writings
of the other authors (Glum, 1925, 1930a, 1931, p. 121;
Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1931, pp. 23–24). Self-government
was a positively connoted term across all party bound-
aries. The principle of self-government had a respected
heritage, it promised the immediate participation of the
groups concerned, and it seemed to suit the German na-
tional character better than a parliamentary democracy.
Hence, it should be noted that, on the one hand,
there was opposition to the parliamentary democratic
model supported by legal scholars designated as demo-
cratic, including Preuß, Anschütz, Thoma, Kelsen, and
Heller (Herrfahrdt, 1922, 1932, p. 30). On the other hand,
the approaches offered by Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Glum,
and Herrfahrdt display elements that conform to the cri-
teria sketched out above:
(1) They all start from the sovereignty of the people.
Legitimacy is deduced neither frommonarchic divine right
nor from any kind of charismatic leadership (Führertum).
Furthermore, the concept of the nation is not understood
in an ethnic, racial or biological sense. After 1933, Tatarin-
Tarnheyden displayed a clearly ethnic-nationalist mindset
(Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1934, p. 32),11 but thiswas not a con-
stituent element of his theory during the Weimar period.
(2) The people are not imagined as an ideal unity but
as a plural entity. The elements constituting plurality are,
however, not individual citizens, but groups. By positing
that group interests should be brought into the social
process of determining the popular will, individual citi-
zens, as decision-making subjects, are passed over. The
ascription of a status to a certain individual reduced the
options to vote positions, parties, or persons not repre-
sented in the status group. However, individual interests
were not to be completely ignored. The process of recon-
ciling individual or particular group interests was simply
shifted to corporate bodies.
(3) The popular will, which consists of particular
group interests, is not merely identified but generated
in a complex process. This could be carried out in a com-
plex system of corporative bodies, according to Tatarin-
Tarnheyden, or in a more consultative setting with par-
liamentary processes of opinion formation, as in Her-
rfahrdt’s concept. This applies toGlum’s approachonly to
a limited extent, because the processes of opinion forma-
tion he refers to, drawing on Smend, serve to “make the
community that is to be represented present as a unity”
(Glum, 1929, p. 32).
(4) This process of generating the popular will took
place in complex organizational structures via inter-
dependent bodies (Tatarin-Tarnheyden) or via the in-
teraction of corporatist consultative bodies and parlia-
mentary decision-making institutions (Herrfahrdt, Glum).
Given that they provided for election—or at least
delegation—procedures, their conceptions clearly en-
compassed democratic elements as well as other, in this
respect, defective features.12
There are important differences to note concerning
the decisive role of parties and associations as media-
tors of interests that democratic theories typically re-
quire. To the extent that parties played any role at all in
the approachesmentioned, it was a subordinate one, dis-
playing the authors’ decidedly hostile attitudes towards
them. In contrast to this hostility, the participation of as-
sociations was highly valued, although, again, harbour-
ing important differences. The various mediations of in-
terests sketched out by Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Herrfahrdt,
and Glum, respectively, defy conventional descriptions.
Focusing on the difference between a pluralistic model
of associations and an authoritarian corporatism, which
is to say between societal and state corporatism13—
especially evident in older literature14—the classification
of state or authoritarian corporatism is obvious. But such
categories are based on the existence of coercive associ-
ations that clearly contradict democratic principles.With
regard to the authors considered here, onemust remem-
ber that they based their theories on the model of the
Imperial Economic Council, where principally representa-
tives of free associations sat (Glum, 1930b, pp. 583–584).
Moreover, they emphasize the essential role of free as-
sociations (Glum, 1925, p. 22, 1929, p. 35; Herrfahrdt,
1925, p. 545, 1932, p. 30),15 even though this is less
pronounced in Tatarin-Tarnheyden’s model of tiered rep-
resentation bodies. What’s more, coercive associations
possess a noteworthy quality that is also constituent for
democratic opinion formation: by involving allmembers
of a group, they considerably broaden the constituency
and thereby can claim a greater breadth of representa-
tion (Collin, 2011, p. 276).
(5) Finally, the concepts presented do not aim to
concentrate power in the hands of a single leader. No-
tions such as “leader” (Führer) and “leadership” can be
10 See also Korioth (1990, p. 132); Otto (2002, pp. 74–76).
11 His repulsively anti-Semitic inclination becomes obvious in: Tatarin-Tarnheyden (1938), especially page 19, contra Kelsen and Heller.
12 For a similar argument regarding Tatarin-Tarnheyden, see Bohn (2011, pp. 73–74).
13 In particular, see Schmitter (1974, pp. 126–128).
14 For an overview, see Reutter (1991, pp. 177–179).
15 Presenting a contrary position that stresses a clear distinction between corporatist concepts and free associations, see Groh (2012, p. 41).
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found continuously in the literature, including the liter-
ature of democratic authors (Eitz, 2015, p. 121); how-
ever, this alone does not warrant the attribution of an
“authoritarian principle” (Führerprinzip) or similar dicta-
torial ideas. There was surely an “authoritarian fad” at
the end of the Weimar Republic, especially among cor-
poratist authors (Beyer, 1941, p. 85; Meyer, 1997, pp.
247–249). However, this boost in popularity was mani-
fested in various ways and not necessarily in the sense
of blazing a path toward a dictatorship (Führerdiktatur).
Glum’s sympathies for fascist Italy (Glum, 1930a), which
were really more aesthetically than politically motivated,
do not indicate a commensurate prescription for Ger-
many. His political machinations aiming at the creation
of a united right-wing front (Weisbrod, 1995) did indeed
include the temporary suspension of democratic princi-
ples, but not their complete abandonment. For Tatarin-
Tarnheyden, too, dictatorial mechanisms were at most
transitional remedies (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1925/1926,
p. 34).16 Herrfahrdt’s principle of “arbitral leadership”,
which was to be implemented should corporatist mecha-
nisms fail (Herrfahrdt, 1925, p. 546, 1932, p. 24), does
not imply that power should be concentrated in the
hands of a dictatorial strongman (Führer). Consequently,
he has been criticized by national-socialists because the
“Führer”, from their perspective, was by no means a neu-
tral arbitrator (Beyer, 1941, p. 83).
In contrast to Sontheimer’s thesis (Sontheimer, 1964,
pp. 200–201), corporatism and the authoritarian princi-
ple were not co-constitutive. And while national-social-
ism had no great affinity for corporatist concepts,17 cor-
poratists did make overtures towards national-socialist
ideology.18 It was above all Tatarin-Tarnheyden who
tried to reconcile corporatism with the authoritarian
principle (Tatarin-Tarnheyden, 1934, p. 28). However,
this cannot be said to be the case prior to 1933. Fi-
nally, authoritarian thought substantially rebuffed demo-
cratic content, but it did not substitute this content with
dictatorial concepts.
4. Conclusion
In theWeimar Republic, corporatist thought experienced
renewed popularity. Some scholars of public law sub-
scribed to this brand of thinking. Though a minority in
the community of public law scholars, they were part of
a broad trend in the contemporary debate.
The concepts developed by those scholars built on
the institution of the Imperial Economic Council pro-
vided for in the Weimar Constitution as an organiza-
tional foundation. The idea contained therein to in-
volve separate groups of social protagonists in lawmak-
ing was developed in various ways. The corporatist au-
thors aimed to strengthen societal self-regulation, on the
one hand, while restraining parliamentary mechanisms,
on the other.
These proposals, however, required justification. As
the concepts went beyond the scope sketched out in the
constitution, legitimation in terms of public law, even
the most supreme law available was insufficient in this
respect. Therefore, their focus was on legitimating con-
siderations from the perspective of constitutional theory
rather than from the perspective of constitutional law.
The considerations proceeded in two directions:
Firstly, they intended to legitimize a significant modifica-
tion concerning the organization of state lawmaking and,
secondly, to justify strengthening societal self-regulation
and the establishment of new forms of private–public
co-regulation. On the input side, legitimation came from
strengthening societal participation, and themore appro-
priate and effective realization of public interests was to
satisfy the output criterion.
One central legitimation topos in these corporatist
concepts was “democracy”, which was closely linked to
the notion of “self-administration”. This was not only
semantic camouflage. The notion of democracy in the
Weimar period was very heterogeneous and remote
from today’s perspective. Understandings of democracy
premised on minimum requirements for effective pop-
ular sovereignty, and considering contemporary circum-
stances, a number of substantial interfaces with demo-
cratic ideas appear, despite some distinctly authoritar-
ian ideas about legitimation, in the corporatist concepts.
They tried to address howpower can be divided between
the state and societal actors in amodern and functionally
differentiated society. Thus, these concepts conceived of
modes of mutual and self-determination in society while
simultaneously paving the way for dictatorship by dis-
crediting the parliamentary democracy.
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